Steering patients away from unnecessary and potentially harmful tests and treatments is an essential component of high-quality primary care. The March 1st issue of American Family Physician includes two articles that reflect this philosophy as embodied in the American Board of Internal Medicine Foundation's Choosing Wisely campaign. Four of the American Geriatrics Society's "Five Things Patients and Physicians Should Question" refer to medications that can be harmful to older patients in certain settings: antipsychotics, hypoglycemics, benzodiazepines, and antibiotics. Dr. Richard Pretorius and colleagues echo this advice and provide additional guidance and systematic approaches to reducing the risk of adverse drug events in older adults.
Sudden hearing loss is a distressing symptom that may prompt a physician to order a CT scan to look for a brain tumor or other cranial mass lesion. However, the American Academy of Otolaryngology - Head and Neck Surgery Foundation advises against ordering this diagnostic test in patients without focal neurologic findings, since the CT scan provides no useful information and exposes the patient to radiation and an expensive medical bill. More information on the evaluation and management of sudden hearing loss is available in AFP's Practice Guidelines summary of the AAO-HNSF's recent clinical guideline.
One reason that clinicians often give for ordering diagnostic tests in patients with a low pretest probability of serious disease is to "reassure the patient." This rationale is used to justify performing endoscopy in patients with dyspepsia but no alarm symptoms; x-rays or magnetic resonance imaging in patients with uncomplicated low back pain; or electrocardiography in patients with chest pain and a low likelihood of cardiac disease. It turns out, though, that negative tests aren't reassuring at all. A recent systematic review and meta-analysis of 14 randomized trials in JAMA Internal Medicine found that diagnostic tests did not reduce patients' illness worry, nonspecific anxiety, or symptom persistence. The only effect of the tests was a small reduction in subsequent primary care visits. Given the adverse effects of diagnostic testing in general, including false positives and overdiagnosis, this "benefit" does not warrant making unwise choices about non-indicated medical tests.
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The above post was first published on the AFP Community Blog.
Monday, 11 March 2013
Wednesday, 6 March 2013
Do practice culture and clinician stress affect patient safety in primary care?
Initiatives to reduce medical errors in inpatient settings have found that sustained improvements in safety cannot be achieved by simply exhorting health professionals to “try harder” or making evidence-based care protocols widely available (1, 2). One obstacle to implementing changes is a toxic “blame and shame” culture that discourages physicians and staff from identifying or admitting medical errors, and therefore resists strategies to isolate and address their causes (3). To overcome this obstacle, leaders need to find ways to systematically change the culture. For example, Pronovost and colleagues incorporated interventions to create a “culture of safety” in the Comprehensive Unit-Based Safety Program that reduced medication errors, lengths of stay, and bloodstream infections in intensive care units at Johns Hopkins Hospital (4) and throughout the state of Michigan (5).
Patient safety studies in outpatient settings have mostly concentrated on minimizing prescribing errors through computerized order entry and improving communication between providers about abnormal test results (6). Compared to the inpatient setting, there are significant gaps in our understanding of what elements of primary care practice cultures and/or organizational climates may affect the incidence of medical errors.
The most ambitious observational study of the impact of organizational climate and physician stress on medical errors and care quality was the Minimizing Error, Maximizing Outcomes (MEMO) study (7, 8). MEMO was a 3-year longitudinal study of 119 practices in New York, Chicago, and Wisconsin that involved collecting data from more than 400 primary care physicians. Investigators used a 4-item scale derived to assess working conditions and organizational climate of primary care practices, and asked physicians about past errors and the likelihood of making future errors. Data from 1795 adult patients with diabetes, hypertension, or heart failure (1 to 8 patients per physician) was reviewed and analyzed for associations between care quality, medical errors (defined as missing recommended processes of care), practice culture, and physician satisfaction.
Although chaotic work environments and low control over their work were strongly associated with physician dissatisfaction, stress, and burnout in the MEMO study, and physicians perceived these factors as increasing their likelihood of making errors in the future (7), organizational climate had no consistent relationship with care quality or medical error scores (8). There are several possible explanations for the lack of association between organizational climate and patient outcomes in this study, including an overly restrictive definition of a medical error, too few patients analyzed per physician, and, of course, the possibility that practice culture did not affect the patient outcomes that were measured. Indeed, the MEMO investigators suggest that ”one interpretation of our findings is that physicians act as buffers between adverse work conditions and patient care – adverse working conditions affect them strongly, but their reactions do not translate into lower-quality care.”
There is considerably greater variation in size and structure among primary care practices than among intensive care units in the U.S., and that variation will likely make it more challenging to implement a “Comprehensive Primary Care-Based Safety Program” even if it proves possible to identify practice cultures that are more conducive to systematic interventions to reduce medical errors in outpatient settings. Nonetheless, several potential strategies have merit:
1) Experimenting with ways to permit primary care patients to report mistakes they observe in processes of care, no matter how inconsequential, so that practices can benefit from their additional perspectives.
2) Designing better systems, electronic or otherwise, to track pending test results to reduce harms associated with the failure to report abnormal results, such as delayed diagnoses.
3) Paying closer attention to adverse effects of clinicians’ chaotic work environments and sense of control (or lack thereof) over their work, two factors that track closely with career satisfaction.
4) Expanding the definition of a medical error in future studies to include not only acts of omission (e.g., not ordering a recommended test), but commission (e.g., unnecessary tests, drugs, or procedures).
5) Examining sources of variation in primary care culture across multiple practices and practice-based research networks.
Pronovost and Sexton observed several years ago about inpatient culture, “We must understand these sources of variation in order to target who to measure, how to score, where to focus efforts to improve culture, and [whom] to hold accountable for improving culture” (9). The same could certainly be said about the culture of primary care, where the science of patient safety is only beginning to move from making controlled observations of medical errors to designing interventions.
References
1. Woodward HI, Mytton OT, Lemer C, et al. What have we learned about interventions to reduce medical errors? Annu Rev Public Health 2010;31:479-97.
2. Curry LA, Spatz E, Cherlin E, et al. What distinguishes top-performing hospitals in acute myocardial infarction mortality rates? Ann Intern Med 2011;154:384-90.
3. Sexton JB, Thomas EJ, Helmreich RL. Error, stress, and teamwork in medicine and aviation: cross sectional surveys. BMJ 2000;320:745-49.
4. Pronovost P, Weast B, Rosenstein B, et al. Implementing and validating a comprehensive unit-based safety program. J Patient Saf 2005;1:33-40.
5. Sexton JB, Berenholtz SM, Goeschel CA, et al. Assessing and improving safety climate in a large cohort of intensive care units. Crit Care Med 2011;39:934-39.
6. Gandhi TK, Lee TH. Patient safety beyond the hospital. N Engl J Med 2010;363:1001-3.
7. Williams ES, Manwell LB, Konrad TR, Linzer M. The relationship of organizational culture, stress, satisfaction, and burnout with physician-reported error and suboptimal patient care: results from the MEMO study. Health Care Manage Rev 2007;32:203-12.
8. Linzer M, Manwell LB, Williams ES, et al. Working conditions in primary care: physician reactions and care quality. Ann Intern Med 2009;151:28-36.
9. Pronovost P, Sexton B. Assessing safety culture: guidelines and recommendations. Qual Safe Health Care 2005;14:231-33.
Patient safety studies in outpatient settings have mostly concentrated on minimizing prescribing errors through computerized order entry and improving communication between providers about abnormal test results (6). Compared to the inpatient setting, there are significant gaps in our understanding of what elements of primary care practice cultures and/or organizational climates may affect the incidence of medical errors.
The most ambitious observational study of the impact of organizational climate and physician stress on medical errors and care quality was the Minimizing Error, Maximizing Outcomes (MEMO) study (7, 8). MEMO was a 3-year longitudinal study of 119 practices in New York, Chicago, and Wisconsin that involved collecting data from more than 400 primary care physicians. Investigators used a 4-item scale derived to assess working conditions and organizational climate of primary care practices, and asked physicians about past errors and the likelihood of making future errors. Data from 1795 adult patients with diabetes, hypertension, or heart failure (1 to 8 patients per physician) was reviewed and analyzed for associations between care quality, medical errors (defined as missing recommended processes of care), practice culture, and physician satisfaction.
Although chaotic work environments and low control over their work were strongly associated with physician dissatisfaction, stress, and burnout in the MEMO study, and physicians perceived these factors as increasing their likelihood of making errors in the future (7), organizational climate had no consistent relationship with care quality or medical error scores (8). There are several possible explanations for the lack of association between organizational climate and patient outcomes in this study, including an overly restrictive definition of a medical error, too few patients analyzed per physician, and, of course, the possibility that practice culture did not affect the patient outcomes that were measured. Indeed, the MEMO investigators suggest that ”one interpretation of our findings is that physicians act as buffers between adverse work conditions and patient care – adverse working conditions affect them strongly, but their reactions do not translate into lower-quality care.”
There is considerably greater variation in size and structure among primary care practices than among intensive care units in the U.S., and that variation will likely make it more challenging to implement a “Comprehensive Primary Care-Based Safety Program” even if it proves possible to identify practice cultures that are more conducive to systematic interventions to reduce medical errors in outpatient settings. Nonetheless, several potential strategies have merit:
1) Experimenting with ways to permit primary care patients to report mistakes they observe in processes of care, no matter how inconsequential, so that practices can benefit from their additional perspectives.
2) Designing better systems, electronic or otherwise, to track pending test results to reduce harms associated with the failure to report abnormal results, such as delayed diagnoses.
3) Paying closer attention to adverse effects of clinicians’ chaotic work environments and sense of control (or lack thereof) over their work, two factors that track closely with career satisfaction.
4) Expanding the definition of a medical error in future studies to include not only acts of omission (e.g., not ordering a recommended test), but commission (e.g., unnecessary tests, drugs, or procedures).
5) Examining sources of variation in primary care culture across multiple practices and practice-based research networks.
Pronovost and Sexton observed several years ago about inpatient culture, “We must understand these sources of variation in order to target who to measure, how to score, where to focus efforts to improve culture, and [whom] to hold accountable for improving culture” (9). The same could certainly be said about the culture of primary care, where the science of patient safety is only beginning to move from making controlled observations of medical errors to designing interventions.
References
1. Woodward HI, Mytton OT, Lemer C, et al. What have we learned about interventions to reduce medical errors? Annu Rev Public Health 2010;31:479-97.
2. Curry LA, Spatz E, Cherlin E, et al. What distinguishes top-performing hospitals in acute myocardial infarction mortality rates? Ann Intern Med 2011;154:384-90.
3. Sexton JB, Thomas EJ, Helmreich RL. Error, stress, and teamwork in medicine and aviation: cross sectional surveys. BMJ 2000;320:745-49.
4. Pronovost P, Weast B, Rosenstein B, et al. Implementing and validating a comprehensive unit-based safety program. J Patient Saf 2005;1:33-40.
5. Sexton JB, Berenholtz SM, Goeschel CA, et al. Assessing and improving safety climate in a large cohort of intensive care units. Crit Care Med 2011;39:934-39.
6. Gandhi TK, Lee TH. Patient safety beyond the hospital. N Engl J Med 2010;363:1001-3.
7. Williams ES, Manwell LB, Konrad TR, Linzer M. The relationship of organizational culture, stress, satisfaction, and burnout with physician-reported error and suboptimal patient care: results from the MEMO study. Health Care Manage Rev 2007;32:203-12.
8. Linzer M, Manwell LB, Williams ES, et al. Working conditions in primary care: physician reactions and care quality. Ann Intern Med 2009;151:28-36.
9. Pronovost P, Sexton B. Assessing safety culture: guidelines and recommendations. Qual Safe Health Care 2005;14:231-33.
Sunday, 3 March 2013
Choosing Wisely's curious omissions
Last month, the American Board of Internal Medicine Foundation's Choosing Wisely Initiative announced the release of a second round of lists of 5 things that physicians and patients should question, based on evidence that certain tests or procedures are not beneficial in specific clinical situations. American Family Physician will soon be updating its list of primary care-relevant items from the Choosing Wisely campaign, and its Facebook and Twitter accounts will highlight old and new entries daily over the next few months. This AAFP News Now article provides more information about the American Academy of Family Physicians' most recent items, which include elective labor inductions and unnecessary cervical cancer screenings.
Notably absent from the lists of the primary care specialty societies and the American Urological Association is routine prostate-specific antigen (PSA) testing, which both the Cochrane Collaboration and the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force have concluded does not improve men's health outcomes. Even though the American Cancer Society and the AUA still support selective use of the PSA test in older men who have been adequately informed of its potential harms, no medical group supports the still-common practice of ordering PSA screening without first discussing it with the patient.
Another curious omission from the top 5 lists of cardiology and thoracic surgery organizations is angioplasty or coronary artery bypass surgery for stable coronary artery disease, which are frequently performed in the U.S. but have no clinical advantages over initial medical management.
From a population health perspective, curtailing prostate cancer overdiagnosis and unnecessary cardiac interventions would be worthy goals to add to a "don't do" list that collectively includes more than one hundred items. Instead, these omissions say quite a bit about the persistence of perverse financial and medicolegal incentives in primary and subspecialty medicine. After all, no one ever sued a doctor for diagnosing cancer (even if it didn't need to be diagnosed) or placing a stent in a partially occluded coronary artery (even if it didn't need to be placed), and insurers rarely (if ever) decline to pay for these wasteful tests and procedures.
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A shortened version of the above post first appeared on the AFP Community Blog.
Notably absent from the lists of the primary care specialty societies and the American Urological Association is routine prostate-specific antigen (PSA) testing, which both the Cochrane Collaboration and the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force have concluded does not improve men's health outcomes. Even though the American Cancer Society and the AUA still support selective use of the PSA test in older men who have been adequately informed of its potential harms, no medical group supports the still-common practice of ordering PSA screening without first discussing it with the patient.
Another curious omission from the top 5 lists of cardiology and thoracic surgery organizations is angioplasty or coronary artery bypass surgery for stable coronary artery disease, which are frequently performed in the U.S. but have no clinical advantages over initial medical management.
From a population health perspective, curtailing prostate cancer overdiagnosis and unnecessary cardiac interventions would be worthy goals to add to a "don't do" list that collectively includes more than one hundred items. Instead, these omissions say quite a bit about the persistence of perverse financial and medicolegal incentives in primary and subspecialty medicine. After all, no one ever sued a doctor for diagnosing cancer (even if it didn't need to be diagnosed) or placing a stent in a partially occluded coronary artery (even if it didn't need to be placed), and insurers rarely (if ever) decline to pay for these wasteful tests and procedures.
**
A shortened version of the above post first appeared on the AFP Community Blog.
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